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BANKRUPTCY SHOPPING: DOMESTIC VENUE RACES AND
GLOBAL FORUM WARS
Anthony J. Casey*
Joshua C. Macey**
ABSTRACT
This Article proposes reforms to bankruptcy law’s venue rules. These
reforms would expand venue choice, reduce opportunistic venue shopping, and
account for the rise of global forum shopping. To date, the leading proposals to
reform venue selection rules for bankruptcy cases have ignored simpler
alternatives that can reduce opportunistic misbehavior while preserving
beneficial choice. Moreover, those proposals have focused exclusively on
restricting a debtor’s choice among venues within the United States while
ignoring the increasing availability and convenience of foreign courts as forums
for distressed corporate debtors seeking to initiate insolvency proceedings. In
this way, the proposals on the table run the risk of failing at their primary goal
and at the same time exacerbating international forum shopping and escalating
a global forum war.
To remedy this, we suggest alternative reforms that account for the
availability of foreign forums, reduce opportunities for harmful venue shopping,
and preserve the benefits of choice. Rather than restrict a debtor’s ability to
select a domestic venue, reforms should (1) allow firms to make an ex ante
commitment to a procedure for choosing a bankruptcy district, and (2) resolve
inconsistencies in substantive bankruptcy law across venues and forums. These
reforms would retain beneficial choice while reducing opportunistic shopping
of both domestic venues and foreign forums. The precommitment mechanism we
propose is preferable to existing proposals even for parties that cannot shop
globally, but the availability of foreign forums makes the case even stronger.
*
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Bankruptcy Code gives debtors wide discretion to
reorganize in the venue of their choice.1 These lenient venue selection rules long
have allowed bankruptcy courts in the District of Delaware and the Southern
District of New York to dominate the market for large chapter 11 cases.2
Recently the Southern District of Texas has also begun to attract a large number
of cases, putting it on equal footing with Delaware and the Southern District of
New York.3
This state of affairs has produced a vigorous debate. On the one side are
critics of liberal venue rules who charge that bankruptcy districts are engaged in
a “race to the bottom” as judges compete for blockbuster chapter 11 cases to the
detriment of local interests, small creditors, and noncontractual claimants.4
Professor Lynn LoPucki, for example, has said that the ability of debtor firms to
so freely choose a venue “undermines the integrity of the bankruptcy system.”5
Similarly, a prominent bankruptcy attorney asserted that “the effort to find
debtor-friendly courts . . . demean[ed] the entire [bankruptcy] system by
suggesting that bankruptcy courts are for sale.”6 For years, the perceptions that
1
As a general matter, a debtor can file for bankruptcy in any federal district where it has its “domicile,
residence, principal place of business in the United States, or principal assets in the United States” or where an
affiliate of the debtor has a pending bankruptcy case. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West). For cross-border cases filed
under chapter 15, the debtor must file in the district of its principal place of business if it has one. See id. § 1410.
Otherwise, it can file in a district where an action is pending against it in a state or federal case, or if no such
district exists, in the district consistent with the interests of justice. Id.
2
While we are not focused on a precise distinction, our discussion relates to the category of large firms
that can roughly be thought of as those with more than $100 million in assets.
3
Jeffrey P. Fuller, Analysis: Big Chapter 11 Cases Find Hospitality in Texas Court, BLOOMBERG L.
(Dec. 11, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-big-chapter-11-cases-findhospitality-in-texas-court; Mark Curriden, Chief Judge David Jones: The Man Who Saved the Texas Bankruptcy
Practice, TEX. LAWBOOK (Aug. 23, 2020), https://texaslawbook.net/chief-judge-david-jones-the-man-whosaved-the-texas-bankruptcy-practice/.
4
See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 9–24 (2006); Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV.
381, 406–11 (2015); Samir D. Parikh, Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy, 46 CONN. L. REV. 159, 161–63
(2013); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New
York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 232–36 (2001); Theodore Eisenberg
& Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 968–71 (1999).
5
Jonathan Randles, Companies Lease Office Space in New York Suburb to Pick Bankruptcy Judge,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-lease-offices-in-new-york-suburb-topick-bankruptcy-judge-11597311001 (“‘The leading bankruptcy lawyers tell the judges what to do,’ [Lynn]
LoPucki said. ‘They’re not asking, they’re telling.’”).
6
Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 4, at 969 n.5. (quoting Minutes of the Nat’l Bankr. Rev. Comm’n
Meeting 13 (Feb. 23–24, 1996) (statement of Gerald Munitz), reprinted in DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, REP. OF THE
DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N TO THE NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N IN SUPPORT OF MAINTAINING EXISTING VENUE
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debtors are abusing the Code’s venue selection rules have fueled calls to prevent,
or at least curtail, bankruptcy venue7 shopping.8
On the other side are those who counter that competition for cases improves
efficiency and predictability as judges develop expertise in overseeing large
chapter 11 cases.9 The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges responded
directly to LoPucki’s critique, writing in a 2018 white paper that it “strongly
rejects any suggestions by Professor LoPucki that any bankruptcy judges make
rulings for reasons other than that which is supported by fact and law.”10 And
Judge Drain, who sits in the popular White Plains division in the Southern
District of New York, has said that the idea that “judges slant their rulings in
order to lure future cases to their courts is an offensive fantasy.”11

CHOICES 2 (1996)).
7
The terminology in the academic literature on this topic is fraught with ambiguity and overlap. For
clarity, we use “venue shopping” and “forum shopping” to refer to separate and distinct concepts. Venue
shopping refers to the choice between different districts within the United States court system. That selection is
governed by venue statutes and notably is a choice between courts within one system and not a choice between
courts in different legal jurisdictions or systems. Forum shopping refers to the choice between courts in different
legal jurisdictions. Thus, forum shopping would include a choice to initiating proceedings in a court in England
rather than in the United States. See infra pages 487–91.
We also discuss the idea that some venue and forum decisions are driven by the parties’ preference for
specific judges, others by preferences for specific legal precedent, and still others by preferences for certain
procedural rules and norms. Though many people use terms like “judge shopping,” we avoid that usage and refer
instead to “preferences” for judges, precedents, or procedural rules. Finally, we do not discuss in this article the
choice that parties sometimes face between asserting their rights in bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy proceedings.
8
Lynn LoPucki has expressed concern about bankruptcy venue shopping for more than twenty years.
See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 4, at 968 (describing “an embarrassing pattern of forum shopping”).
9
See Jared A. Ellias, What Drives Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? Evidence from Market Data, 47 J.
LEGAL STUD. 119, 145–47 (2018) (finding greater predictability of outcomes in Delaware and the Southern
District of New York, and no evidence of bias); Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based
Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 437–62 (2006); Kenneth
Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis of
Venue Choice in Bankruptcy 12–18 (May 21, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of
Pennsylvania Carey Law School); G. Marcus Cole, Delaware Is Not a State: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional
Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1850–58 (2002); David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s So Bad About
Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 309, 309–15 (2001) [hereinafter Skeel, What’s So Bad About Delaware?]; Robert
K. Rasmussen & Randal S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1357–63 (2000); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some
Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 1–5 (1998) [hereinafter Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy
Venue]. Samir Parikh has urged the European Union to adopt lenient forum selection rules to improve efficiency
and predictability in European restructuring cases. See Samir D. Parikh, Bankruptcy Tourism and the European
Union’s Corporate Restructuring Quandary: The Cathedral in Another Light, 42 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 205, 213–14
(2020).
10
Nat’l Comm. of Bankr. Judges, NCBJ Special Committee on Venue: Report on Proposal for Revision
of the Venue Statute in Commercial Bankruptcy Cases, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 741, 810 (2019).
11
Randles, supra note 5.
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Recently, this debate has taken on practical importance. In the past three
years, Congress has introduced multiple bills that would amend the Code to
require that a debtor file in the district in which its “principal assets or principal
place of business” is located.12 These amendments would prevent debtors from
choosing venue based on their state of incorporation and would eliminate other
opportunities for debtors to opt into the venue of their choice. Though these
proposals have yet to receive a majority in either the House or Senate, they have
attracted bipartisan support,13 and President Biden has signaled that he is
sympathetic to bankruptcy venue reform.14
Proposals to eliminate venue shopping, if successful, would effect a sea
change in American bankruptcy practice. Instead of being concentrated in New
York, Delaware, and Texas, large corporate reorganizations would be
distributed more evenly across the country. Districts would become responsible
for overseeing corporate reorganizations involving locally headquartered
debtors regardless of whether the local bankruptcy judge has experience
managing large dollar cases, and even if the jurisdiction has not developed
procedures for quickly providing emergency relief.15
Rather than take sides in the conventional debate about whether venue
shopping is good or bad, this Article suggests reform principles that should
appeal to those on both sides. Reforms that retain the benefits of choice while
reducing the opportunities for harmful shopping should be favored regardless of
one’s view about whether venue shopping is a large problem, a small problem,
or no problem at all. Our proposed reforms would do exactly that. Moreover,
they address a problem that has largely been ignored in the conventional debate:
the rise of global forum shopping as an alternative for debtors seeking to initiate
insolvency proceedings.
With regard to global forum shopping, this Article cautions that
developments in foreign jurisdictions may limit the effectiveness of these venue
12
Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2018, S. 2282, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018). Debtors would also be able
to file in a district where a parent entity has a pending bankruptcy case. See id.; Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act
of 2019, H.R. 4421, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019).
13
One was co-sponsored by Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren (D) and Texas Senator John Cornyn
(R). Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2018, S. 2282, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018).
14
See The Biden Plan for Bankruptcy Reform, https://joebiden.com/bankruptcyreform/. Biden’s support
for the bill marks a policy reversal, as the President previously opposed efforts to take cases from Delaware and
New York. See Bankruptcy Reform: Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 75 (2005)
(statement of then-Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Member, Senate Judiciary Committee).
15
Nat’l Comm. of Bankr. Judges, supra note 10, at 788 (explaining that “the current magnet courts have
well-defined procedures assuring that first day motions will be heard and decided promptly, other courts do
not—instead addressing the need for emergency relief on an ad hoc basis.”) (internal citation omitted).
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reform proposals. Although chapter 11 is often regarded as the gold standard for
corporate reorganizations, in recent years, foreign jurisdictions have emerged as
convenient forums for distressed debtors.16 For instance, in many cases, the
English scheme of arrangement now represents a viable alternative to the
American bankruptcy system, and over the past decade, a number of companies
have chosen to use an English scheme of arrangement to restructure their debt
instead of chapter 11, with the first United States-headquartered business doing
so in 2019.17 Other jurisdictions have also sought to entice foreign debtors, with
insolvency specialists speculating that Singapore, in particular, could become
“an international centre for debt restructuring.”18
Because American bankruptcy courts freely recognize foreign insolvency
proceedings,19 firms that are directed to file in less favored districts may instead
choose to reorganize in a foreign jurisdiction. In this environment, attempts to
limit venue selection within the United States will have the opposite of their
intended effect, replacing domestic venue shopping with even worse instances
of global forum shopping.
By ignoring the availability of foreign forums, current venue reform
proposals could, perversely, drive opportunistic debtors and creditors to
restructure in foreign jurisdictions like England, Singapore, Mexico, and the
Netherlands, undermining the purpose of proposed reforms and diminishing
America’s influence on corporate bankruptcy law in general. Any solution
targeted at reducing opportunistic venue shopping must, therefore, also consider
opportunistic forum shopping and treat the questions cohesively.20
16
See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Good Old Chapter 11 in a Pre-Insolvency World: The
Growth of Global Reorganization Options, 46 N.C. J. INT’L L. 353 (2021) (noting the rise of global alternatives
to chapter 11).
17
See Simon Thomas & Oonagh Steel, US-Based Syncreon Chooses English Scheme of Arrangement
over Chapter 11 for Financial and Corporate Restructure, GOODWIN (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.
goodwinlaw.com/publications/2019/09/09_13-us-based-syncreon-chooses-english-scheme.
18
Singapore’s Efforts to Become an International Hub for Debt Restructuring, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
(Jan. 2019), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/8e5a46f4/singapores-efforts-tobecome-an-international-hub-for-debt-restructuring.
19
Rejection based on the substantive procedural rules of the foreign proceeding are rare. See, e.g., In re
Vitro SAB de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031, 1061–62 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding a rare exception). The broad attention and
commentary in response to that case underscores the rarity of such outcomes. See, e.g., Maurizio Anglani, In re
Vitro Fifth Circuit Declines to Enforce Mexican Plan and Crafts New Framework for Foreign Debtor Relief,
AM. BANKR. INST., https://www.abi.org/member-resources/blog/in-re-vitro-fifth-circuit-declines-to-enforcemexican-plan-of-reorganization (opining that “In re Vitro is a significant case for practitioners involved in crossborder restructuring[s].”).
20
One might try to independently prohibit global forum shopping. But this is unrealistic for several
reasons. First, foreign jurisdictions battling for cases are essentially unconstrained in their ability to attract
debtors by changing their substantive law. Second, domestic rules dictating a specific forum for cross-border
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To address this, we argue that, rather than limit domestic venue choice,
lawmakers should (1) support the development of ex ante commitment to
mechanisms for choosing venue and forum; and (2) whenever possible, resolve
inconsistencies in substantive law across venues and forums. These are general
principles of reform, and the implementation will depend on context. For
example, commitment mechanisms look different for venue than they do for
forum. But, if designed properly, these measures can reduce the costs of venue
and forum shopping without giving up the benefits that come from allowing
some choice.
It is worth noting that our approach would unbundle venue choice from
unrelated matters such as a firm’s state of incorporation or principal place of
business. This is a feature, not a bug. By bundling the choice of bankruptcy
venue with the debtor’s state of incorporation or domicile, the existing rules
force debtors to sacrifice optimal choice on one dimension to achieve it on
another.21 This is wasteful. There is no reason to think that optimal venue
coincides with domicile or state of incorporation. While the existing reform
proposals would unbundle state of incorporation from bankruptcy venue, they
leave the other wasteful bundles intact. Our proposal would unbundle
everything, allowing venue choice without forcing the debtor to incur wasteful
costs of incorporation (or reincorporation) or of moving its domicile or principal
assets.
Finally, the merits of our proposal are independent of one’s view on the
current state of venue shopping. If venue shopping is a real problem, the
principles we introduce address that problem. If venue shopping is not a
problem, the principles do no harm and even expand the choice set for debtors.
Similarly, while the principles address the problem of global forum shopping,
the benefits with regard to venue shopping result with or without the availability
of foreign forums. The same cannot be said of the status quo or the reforms
currently being considered.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the debate about venue
shopping and considers the various costs and benefits of venue choice. Part II
describes chapter 15 of the Code and recent developments in cross-border
insolvency proceedings. Part III explores the connection between domestic
venue reform and global forum shopping and argues that the current reform
proceedings are difficult to enforce. Third, even when enforceable, such rules impose extreme costs by disrupting
the global cross-border insolvency systems.
21
Our strong intuition is that firms making an incorporation decision focus on the corporate governance
rules and accept the venue option as part of that bundle rather than the other way around.
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proposals are problematic in a world where parties can opt for a foreign forum
if they do not like the domestic option. Part IV introduces the two foundational
elements for reforms that would encourage socially productive venue and forum
shopping and deter opportunistic shopping and competition.
I.

BANKRUPTCY VENUE SHOPPING

Current bankruptcy law allows a debtor to file bankruptcy in a district where
any one of its affiliates is incorporated or where any one of its affiliates has its
principal place of business or principal assets.22 In some cases a debtor can even
create or move a small affiliate for the sole purpose of accessing venue.23
Critics of bankruptcy venue shopping argue that giving a debtor such broad
discretion in choosing venue supports opportunistic behavior. They charge that
debtors seek out venue with favorable local rules and bankruptcy judges who are
sympathetic to incumbent management and senior creditors at the expense of
other stakeholders. Supporters of the current system respond that large chapter
11 filings concentrate in certain districts because judges in those districts have
developed expertise in managing mega-cases and because those districts yield
predictable and quick outcomes. In other words, venue shopping reflects either
a race to the bottom that debases the integrity of the system or a race to the top
where debtors file in districts that can most efficiently handle large cases.24 This
Part examines these two ideas.
A. History of Bankruptcy Venue Shopping
Immediately after the Code was passed in 1978,25 a disproportionate number
of large bankruptcy cases were filed in the Southern District of New York.26 In
particular, debtors were drawn to Judge Burton R. Lifland, who was widely
perceived to be “pro-debtor” and “pro-reorganization.”27

22

28 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West).
See Nicholas Cordova, Bankruptcy Venue Reform, HARV. L. SCH. BANKR. ROUNDTABLE (May 26,
2020), https://blogs.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/2020/05/26/bankruptcy-venue-reform/ (describing how
the Boy Scouts of America managed to file in Delaware by creating an affiliate seven months before filing).
24
See In re Crosby Nat’l Golf Club, LLC, 534 B.R. 888, 894–95 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015) (arguing that
venue shopping proponents’ explanations are unconvincing and suggesting that proximity to elite law firms may
be a better explanation of Delaware and New York’s dominance).
25
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
26
Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 4, at 983.
27
Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 4, at 984.
23
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New York’s dominance was short-lived, however, as Delaware emerged as
a popular venue in the late 1980s.28 Delaware bankruptcy judges, particularly
Judge Helen Balick and, later, Judge Mary Walrath, implemented practices and
issued rulings that drew debtors to Delaware. These included procedural
innovations that supported judicial efficiency on important issues such as the use
of first-day motions and orders.29 Judge Walrath, for example, “was widely
praised for her ability to decide first-day orders before the end of business on the
day after the petition is filed.”30 These rulings are thought to have encouraged
debtors to file in Delaware and, by the mid-1990s, a majority of the largest
bankruptcy cases were filed in the state.31
More recently, the Southern District of Texas has emerged as an attractive
alternative to Delaware and New York. Judge David Jones, Chief Judge of the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, has been
credited with “singlehandedly breath[ing] new life into a Texas business
bankruptcy practice that had witnessed nearly all its work shift to Delaware and
Manhattan during the previous two decades.”32 Beginning in 2016, Judge Jones
introduced a series of reforms that increased transparency and predictability in
bankruptcies filed in his district, and since then large corporate debtors have
flocked to the Southern District of Texas.33 A similar story may be playing out
in the Eastern District of Virginia, where, as of September 2020, 9% of
bankruptcies filed by large publicly traded companies were filed in 2020.34 As
in Texas, commentators have credited the district’s efficiency and predictability
as a cause of its increased case load.35
B. A Judicial Race—To the Bottom or to the Top?
Critics of liberal venue selection rules worry that venue shopping leads to
debtor opportunism. And these critics feel strongly about the issue. Texas
Senator John Cornyn, for example, reportedly asked one bankruptcy scholar if

28

Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 4, at 983–84.
See Barry E. Adler & Henry N. Butler, On the “Delawarization of Bankruptcy” Debate, 52 EMORY
L.J. 1309, 1311 (2003).
30
Cole, supra note 9, at 1865.
31
Adler & Butler, supra note 29, at 1311.
32
See Curriden, supra note 3.
33
See Curriden, supra note 3.
34
See Alex Wolf, Big-Name Bankruptcies Flock to Two-Judge Court in Virginia, BLOOMBERG L.
(Sept. 15, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/big-name-bankruptcies-flock-to-two-judgecourt-in-virginia.
35
See id.
29
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venue shopping “is a cancer on our bankruptcy system.”36 Such opportunism is
thought to occur both because debtors file in districts that are sympathetic to
managers, debtors, and senior creditors, and because venue shopping may reflect
an attempt to alter substantive outcomes by taking advantage of procedural
differences between districts.37
Perhaps the most common critique of liberal venue rules is that judges
compete for big cases by offering favorable treatment to management and senior
creditors at the expense of other stakeholders. This critique is often associated
with Professor Lynn LoPucki, who has argued for more than two decades that
competition among judges undermines the integrity of the American bankruptcy
system.38 LoPucki and other critics of liberal venue rules worry that competition
for cases allows elite law firms with large bankruptcy practices to drive filings
to districts that favor incumbent managers.39 On this view, bankruptcy venue
shopping has operated to protect managers who have perpetuated corporate
fraud and who seek venues that will privilege their interests over those of other
stakeholders.40
On the other side of the debate are those who claim the judges are engaged
in a race to the top. These proponents of venue shopping argue that competition
for cases has led to innovations that have increased judicial efficiency and
predictability.41 In this story, judicial competition for cases encourages judicial
experimentation, and judges competing for cases in a system with liberal venue
36

Todd Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting Bankruptcy Courts?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1142–43

(2006).
37
As David Skeel has pointed out, while popular venues are often critiqued for being “debtor-friendly,”
the nature of this alleged favoritism differs by region. See Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue,
supra note 9, at 20. Skeel notes that:

Although critics often suggest that judges in Delaware and New York are debtor friendly in the
same way, the two districts actually have established quite different reputations among
practitioners––reputations that are amply borne out by their track records in large cases. The New
York judges are known for their willingness to repeatedly extend the exclusivity period during
which the managers of a large debtor are the only ones who can propose a reorganization plan.
Because extended exclusivity reduces the pressure for a debtor’s managers to act quickly, it can
encourage long, drawn-out, costly bankruptcy cases. Delaware’s judges, on the other hand, have
established precisely the opposite reputation. Rather than lengthy cases, Delaware is known for
its speedy confirmation of reorganization plans.
Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue, supra note 9, at 20.
38
See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 4, at 968–69.
39
Lynn M. LoPucki, Book Summary, Courting Failure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 332–34 (2006)
[hereinafter LoPucki, Courting Failure Book Summary].
40
Id. at 334 (citing LOPUCKI, supra note 4, at 17–18).
41
See, e.g., Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue, supra note 9, at 22–27 (“Rather than
lengthy cases, Delaware is known for its speedy confirmation of reorganization plans.”).
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rules have an incentive to innovate and make the bankruptcy process more
efficient. For example, the emergence of Delaware in the 1990s was reportedly
based on the district’s convenient first day filing rules.42 Likewise, Texas
became more popular after Judge Jones implemented procedural reforms to
increase the efficiency and transparency of filings and created a special twojudge panel to handle large, complex bankruptcy cases.43
Whether competition is actually good or bad depends on whether one thinks
that the procedural and substantive innovations that drive venue selection are
themselves good or bad. For example, judicial competition might be found in
some judges’ willingness to approve prepackaged or prenegotiated bankruptcy
plans. Delaware’s popularity as a bankruptcy venue may have been due in part
to the district’s “reputation for speed,”44 and, in particular, its willingness to
approve such plans.45 The key question—whether those plans produce net value
to the estate—is an empirical one that remains open.
One should also maintain a healthy dose of skepticism about theories of
competition—good or bad—that rely on judges changing their rulings in order
to attract more cases. The incentives behind such competition are ambiguous.
Professor Marcus Cole has emphasized this point, noting that one judge
questioned the idea that there is a psychic benefit to a judge who attracts more
cases (and more work!) to her court.46 Additionally, judges strongly deny such
competition––at least with regard to substantive decisions47––with one calling it
an “offensive fantasy.”48 And the evidence in favor of such theories, most of
which is anecdotal, is questionable at best.49
Even if judges are competing, their motivations might be entirely unrelated
to caseloads. Professor Cole suggests a more benign form of “professional”

42

Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue, supra note 9, at 21.
Mark Curriden, Meet the Judge Who Saved the Texas Bankruptcy, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Sept. 1, 2020,
9:19 AM) https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Meet-the-judge-who-saved-the-Texas-bankruptcy15528320.php.
44
Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue, supra note 9, at 27; Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra
note 4, at 970 (questioning whether Delaware processes cases faster than other districts).
45
See Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue, supra note 9, at 27.
46
See Cole, supra note 9, at 1876; Zywicki, supra note 36, at 1181 (noting that the incentive for judges
to compete for more cases “is unclear”).
47
Judges acknowledge that efficient process is a way to attract cases. For example, Chief Judge David
Jones in the Southern District of Texas has been fairly explicit that his procedural innovations were motivated
in part to attract large cases. See Curriden, supra note 38.
48
Randles, supra note 5 (quoting Judge Drain).
49
See Zywicki, supra note 36, at 1167 (noting a lack of evidence that judges’ decisions were motivated
by a desire to attract subsequent cases).
43
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competition where judges compete not for cases but simply for “satisfaction for
the excellent discharge of their duties.”50 He recounts a representative story of
Judge Walrath transferring a case to the Southern District of Texas after noting
that the debtor would get better service there because her calendar was full and
Texas had created new rules putting its procedures in line with Delaware.51
In the end, the question remains unanswered, but the burden for showing that
judges are consciously ignoring the law or changing substantive outcomes (for
better or worse) to attract cases lies with those making that accusation.
C. Debtor’s Choice
That being said, venue shopping (good or bad) can and will occur even
without a deliberate judicial race. Every judge will have a unique approach to
cases, and that approach may tend to favor debtors or creditors. Lawyers will
look for observable trends, and debtors’ lawyers will take those trends into
account when choosing where to file. To suggest otherwise is absurd. None of
this requires that the judges compete for—or are even conscious of—venue
considerations. It simply reflects the fact that lawyers will choose what they
perceive to be the most attractive venues. That can be a good story or a bad story
or bit of both.
1. Debtor’s Choice: The Good Story
Many have argued that venue choice is driven by debtors’ need for
predictability, developed case law, judicial expertise, and speed.52 These are all
desirable attributes of a court system. And they can emerge with or without
judicial competition for cases. Indeed, these attributes tend to be selfreinforcing. Judges develop experience by managing large cases, and they
implement efficient procedures as they learn what works and what does not. As
a result, judges in popular districts are likely to become more experienced simply
by virtue of being located in popular districts. Developed case law, too, will
attract filings, which in turn will support the further development of case law in
the district and further reinforce the expertise of the judges located in the district.
Moreover, as a district experiences a larger volume of filings, debtors will have

50

Cole, supra note 9, at 1848.
Cole, supra note 9, at 1856.
52
See NAT’L CONF. OF BANKR. JUDGES, NCBJ SPECIAL COMMISSION ON VENUE: REPORT ON PROPOSAL
FOR REVISION OF THE VENUE STATUTE IN COMMITTEE BANKRUPTCY CASES 68–76 (2018); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-839, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: STAKEHOLDERS HAVE MIXED VIEWS ON
ATTORNEYS’ FEE GUIDELINES AND VENUE SELECTION FOR LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES 22–26 (2015).
51
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a larger set of cases from which to make predictions about how a particular
district will approach a certain type of debtor.
Similarly, debtors may use liberal venue rules to avoid local bias. Home
venues may be particularly vulnerable to economic disruptions that affect
employment in the area. A bankruptcy rule that forces debtors to file in their
home venues could put a thumb on the scale of local and regional interests. Local
judges may, for example, be skeptical of value-enhancing reorganizations that
adversely affect local employment, or they may be influenced by local political
pressures.53 Permitting debtors to file in the venue of their choice may allow
debtors to obtain neutral judges whose views are not biased by these local
interests.54
Again, these benefits can build on each other. As some debtors choose
Delaware courts to avoid local biases, the Delaware courts will gain expertise
and thus attract more debtors, further increasing their expertise and efficiency
and leading Delaware to be the forum of choice for all of these desirable reasons.
2. Debtor’s Choice: The Neutral Story
Debtors’ lawyers prefer to know which judge will preside over a bankruptcy
filing. When Delaware first gained prominence, it had one judge. Lawyers noted
that they liked knowing exactly which judge would hear the case. Later, when it
had two judges, that still presented a relative advantage to the Southern District
of New York.
In some sense, this attribute is hard to maintain. As venues become more
popular, their caseloads grow, and new judges may be appointed or visiting
judges may sit by designation. Delaware, for example, has grown from one to
eight judges since the 1990s.
53

See Zywicki, supra note 36, at 1165.
That is perhaps one reason why Delaware is uniquely attractive for debtors seeking to escape local bias
when choosing a venue. For most large firms, Delaware is both a proper venue because of incorporation and a
venue without local bias because few firms operate their principal business there. There are exceptions, which
tend to prove the rule. In one Delaware bankruptcy case the debtor had a major assembly plant in Delaware. The
jobs associated with that plant were important to local interests and were likely to be affected by sale proceedings
in the case. As if to prove the dangers of local bias, a United States Senator from Delaware and a United States
Representative from Delaware issued a press release noting their hope that the bankruptcy proceedings would
favor keeping the plant open, criticizing the planned sale procedures, and explaining how they thought the case
should proceed. To make sure the views of these powerful Delaware politicians were known to the court, The
Delaware Economic Development Authority, a state agency, then attached the press release to a court filing. See
Press Release, Tom Carper, Senator, U.S. Senate, Carper, Carney Issue Statement on Fisker’s Bankruptcy Court
Proceedings (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.carper.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/1/carper-carney-issue-statement-onfisker-s-bankruptcy-court-proceedings.
54
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But there are ways to maintain predictability in the face of growth. For
example, while the Southern District of Texas has five bankruptcy judges, its
rise to prominence was facilitated in part by a working order assigning all large
chapter 11s to one of two judges. Similarly, the Southern District of New York
is subdivided into divisions. And the White Plains division is particularly
popular in part because it has a single judge with a known track record lending
to predictability.55
Obviously, predictability is not the only relevant consideration—no one
wants certainty of incompetence—but among equally competent venues,
lawyers claim to prefer those in which the judicial assignment is more
predictable.56
This strikes us as a mostly benign version of venue shopping. All else equal,
there is nothing especially remarkable about the number of judges available in a
district. Some might argue that predictability allows lawyers to prepare more
efficiently while others might argue that it causes lawyers to waste resources
tailoring their case to the whims of a particular judge.57 The phenomenon is selflimiting as a single-judge district or division has a natural limit to its docket.
And so the value of this type of venue shopping is likely to be indeterminate.
A related incentive might also be at play. Recent empirical research suggests
that corporate bankruptcy cases are run more efficiently when lawyers have
connections to the presiding judge.58 This research focuses on connections
55
See Renae Merle & Lenny Bernstein, Purdue’s Choice of NY Bankruptcy Court Part of Common
Forum Shopping Strategy, Experts Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2019, 6:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/2019/10/10/purdues-choice-ny-bankruptcy-court-part-common-forum-shopping-strategyexperts-say/; Dave Zucker, Why Did Purdue Pharma File for Bankruptcy in Westchester County?,
WESTCHESTER MAG. (Sept. 20, 2019), https://westchestermagazine.com/life-style/business/why-did-purduepharma-file-for-bankruptcy-in-westchester-county/. In April 2020, this predictability was reduced. Because the
case load in White Plains had increased, the court entered a standing order to assign some of the White Plains
cases to a second judge sitting in the Manhattan division. See Modification of Assignment of Cases and
Proceedings to the Honorable Sean H. Lane (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020) (General Order M-547).
56
See Cole, supra note 9, at 1886 (noting that lawyers reported that predictability on which judge they
would draw was the primary factor in venue choice and noting the importance of Delaware’s having only one
judge and then two judges in the 1990s and that lawyers valued predictability about a specific judge they would
draw the most); Ryan Messina, Changing the Bankruptcy Venue Statutes Would Undermine the Effectiveness of
the U.S. Corporate Bankruptcy System, 44 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. ONLINE (2020) (“Purportedly higher fees are
offset by the cost-efficient administration of complex cases by experienced jurists and professionals that
effectuate predictability and post-restructuring survival.”).
57
At the appellate level, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit worries about lawyers
pandering to a specific judge this way. As a result, the litigants are not told which judges will hear their case
until the day of argument.
58
See Vidhan K. Goyal, Josh Madsen & Wei Wang, Lawyer Networks and Corporate Bankruptcies 1
(Aug. 3, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3666263.
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related to clerkships, alumni networks, and prior cases. The results are dramatic:
such connections can reduce the duration of the case by around three months.59
Importantly, these connections do not distort outcomes, and they do not create
judicial bias or favoritism. They simply make the process more efficient.60 To
the extent debtors are aware of this effect, they would be foolish not to consider
it when choosing a venue (and a lawyer!).
It is difficult to measure the cost and benefits of such forum shopping. On
the one hand, shopping for efficient case management is socially useful. On the
other hand, if that efficiency is based on social connections, it raises questions
about the distributional fairness of the bankruptcy process. Moreover, because
these connections include prior case experience before the judge, they are
endogenous and self-perpetuating. Overall efficiency might be improved by
forcing lawyers to establish broader connections across venues.
3. Debtor’s Choice: The Bad Story
Empirical evidence that popular venues decide cases more swiftly than less
popular venues need not be framed as evidence that debtors are selecting
efficient venues. It can also support the opposite story, where debtors are
choosing speedy venues because those venues fail to give enough consideration
to junior claimants. Popular venues might be quick and efficient while also
offering an opportunity for debtors to evade regulatory scrutiny, or otherwise
extract value from unsophisticated or nonadjusting creditors.
Note that this story requires no misbehavior on the part of judges or lawyers.
But it is still problematic. If the substantive outcome of a case turns on the
location of the bankruptcy filing, then parties will waste resources fighting over
the choice of venue.61 Moreover, venue shopping of this sort can allow managers
to extract value from other stakeholders at the time of filing.
Similarly, debtors might shop for venues to find and take advantage of a
particular district’s perceived biases. Indeed, some of the more egregious
examples of forum shopping involve debtors who have filed outside of Delaware
and New York in order—it seems—to exploit regional or local biases in hopes
of distorting substantive law.62
59

Id. at 18.
Id.
61
This is all familiar to lawyer and academics. There is a vast literature on the biases and behaviors of
judges and the effects those behaviors have on litigation choices in all contexts.
62
Patriot Coal’s attempt to transfer venue from New York to West Virginia seems to have been motivated
at least in part by the view that West Virginia would offer a more sympathetic venue for mine workers. See Alan
60
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One recent attempt to exploit regional biases was the chapter 11 filing of the
National Rifle Association (NRA) in the Northern District of Texas. If one
believes the NRA’s own statements, the filing appears to be an attempt to find a
favorable judge who will allow the company to circumvent New York law. At
the time of filing, the NRA issued a press release explaining that the purpose of
the bankruptcy was “to exit what it believes is a corrupt political and regulatory
environment in New York.”63 The press release further stated that the NRA was
“dumping New York.”64
Lest one doubt that local biases exist, after the filing was announced the
Governor of Texas promptly tweeted, “Welcome to Texas—a state that
safeguards the 2nd Amendment.”65 Of course, the success of this gambit will
turn on the predisposition of a judge who has demonstrated no sign that he will
in fact offer a more sympathetic venue.66
Scholars have thus criticized bankruptcy venue shopping for giving
incumbent managers an outsized advantage, exhibiting pro-reorganization
biases, disfavoring junior investors, and disadvantaging nonadjusting and
nonconsensual creditors.67 The recurring theme in all of these criticisms is that
the debtor chooses a venue that it believes will further its interests at the expense
of other stakeholders.
4. Debtor’s Choice: The Worst Story
Still, the most problematic aspect of liberal venue shopping has nothing to
do with the individual bankruptcy judges or the race to the bottom. Rather it
arises from differences in controlling precedent. Debtors that can shop among
venues take advantage of differences in local precedents to alter substantive
rules and outcomes. This is true for all litigation, but liberal venue rules make it

Zimmerman, In Patriot Coal Venue Dust-up, Future Court Decision Framed as ‘Justice’ vs. ‘Convenience’,
S&P GLOB. (Sept. 6, 2012), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/leveraged-loan-news/in-patriot-coal-venue-dust-up-future-court-decision-framed-as-justice-vsconvenience.
63
See Press Release, NRA, NRA Leaves New York to Reincorporate in Texas, Announces New Strategic
Plan (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.nraforward.org/press-release.
64
Id.
65
Greg Abbott (@GregAbbott_TX), TWITTER (Jan. 15, 2021), https://twitter.com/GregAbbott_TX/
status/1350191813571784704?s=20.
66
On the first day, the judge criticized the parties for their extreme rhetoric and added, “I would ask that
everyone sort of ratchet that part of the case down some, now that we’re in bankruptcy court.” See Danny Hakim
& Mary Williams Walsh, The N.R.A. Wants to ‘Dump’ Its Regulators via Bankruptcy. Will It Succeed?, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/21/business/nra-bankruptcy-new-york.html.
67
See LOPUCKI, supra note 4, at 97–122.
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especially easy for bankruptcy cases. When a debtor has almost unfettered
discretion to file in the district of its choice, its lawyers have good reason to seek
out the venue with legal precedents that are most helpful to the debtor’s case.
The decision of Caesars Entertainment Operating Company (CEOC) to file
its (and its affiliates’) chapter 11 petition in the Northern District of Illinois is an
example of a case where a debtor seems to have chosen a particular venue to
take advantage of local precedent—specifically, Seventh Circuit precedent on
third-party releases and executory contracts.68
When CEOC and its affiliates entered bankruptcy, there were many live
disputes among its stakeholders, including claims that CEOC and its creditors
had against CEOC’s parent company, Caesars Entertainment Company (CEC).
CEOC’s claims against CEC––which was not a debtor in the bankruptcy––arose
from a series of transfers from CEOC to CEC. The creditor claims against CEC
related to CEOC debts that had been guaranteed by CEC.
On January 12, 2015, holders of the second lien notes initiated an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding in the District of Delaware.69 Delaware was
a proper venue because CEOC was incorporated there.70 Three days later, on
January 15, CEOC filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition in the Northern District
of Illinois.71 The Northern District of Illinois was also a proper venue because
at least one of CEOC’s affiliates was incorporated in Illinois and—having filed
first—had a pending bankruptcy case in that venue.72
Thus, the stage was set for a major venue dispute. CEOC freely admitted to
venue shopping.73 It claimed to have chosen to file in the Northern District of
Illinois in part to take advantage of favorable legal precedents in the Seventh
Circuit regarding the assumption of executory contracts and third-party
releases.74 The stakes were significant, with the company’s CEO testifying that
the difference in precedent between the two venues could impact earnings “by
as much as $40 million.”75
68
Third-party releases release certain non-debtor parties such as officers, directors, or affiliates of the
company from liability and guaranties upon confirmation of the plan.
69
In re Caesars Ent. Operating Co., Inc., 808 F.3d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 2015).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Of course, to the extent the creditors trying to force the case into Delaware were doing so based on the
same differences in precedent, they were also venue shopping. Though their exact motives may have been more
complicated. Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
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Such venue shopping is problematic. That is not to say that the precedent in
the Seventh Circuit is wrong and the precedent in the Third Circuit is right. Nor
even that that the debtors’ or creditors’ lawyers misbehaved. When there is a
choice between two proper venues with different rules, a lawyer should choose
the one that favors her client.
Rather, the real problem is that two such venues exist in the first place.
Inconsistent substantive law across venues motivates parties to expend resources
to fight over where the case should be filed. The CEOC bankruptcy produced
just such a fight in the form of costly litigation76 that could have been avoided if
the substantive rules were consistent across venues.
The potential scope of this form of venue shopping is limited in two ways.
First, it is unlikely that there is jurisdictional competition with regard to these
differences in precedent. Controlling precedent is set by the courts of appeals.
Those courts do not decide cases based on the perceived dominance of
bankruptcy districts within their circuit.77 That is fortunate. Jurisdictional
competition should be about expertise and efficient case administration—not
about the substantive rules that affect creditor recoveries.
Second, the opportunities for such differences in precedent are constrained
because bankruptcy courts exist in one unified legal system.78 Inconsistent rules
for third-party releases can (and should) be resolved either by a ruling of the
Supreme Court or by an amendment to the Code.79 Still, differences do persist—
in part because the Supreme Court is slow to resolve splits80—and do distort
incentives for venue choice in certain cases.

76
At one point, the two courts held simultaneous hearings. The two courtrooms were full, two judges’
resources were being taken up, and dozens of the most expensive lawyers in the country were arguing the venue
issues in the same case in two different courtrooms.
77
It would be quite a stretch to suggest that appeals courts like those in the Second and Third Circuits are
deciding cases as part of a race to secure the dominance of the bankruptcy courts in Wilmington, Delaware, and
White Plains, New York.
78
In this way, the bankruptcy venue race is very different from the incorporation race. Each state can
choose its own laws of incorporation and governance. And the internal affairs doctrine gives them broad latitude
in doing so. Thus, the Delaware legislature and court system can compete with differential substantive
corporation law in a way that a bankruptcy judge cannot.
79
That is not to say that Congress or the Supreme Court should resolve all bankruptcy circuit splits.
Inconsistent case law can generate useful information that can inform later policy decisions. We simply point
out that this motivation for venue shopping can be easily resolved in many cases without limiting debtor venue
choice.
80
See, e.g., Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, 139 U.S. 1652, 1666 (2019) (resolved a
decades-old split about the rejection of certain executory contracts); N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods.,
556 U.S. 1145, 1147 (2009) (statement of Justice Kennedy) (noting in the context of a cert denial the importance
in the future of resolving a longstanding circuit split regarding the assumption of certain executory contracts).
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5. Debtor’s Choice: The Inefficient Bundling Story
Waste also arises because current venue rules unnecessarily bundle venue
choice with other unrelated matters such as state of incorporation or principal
place of business.
There is no reason to think that the quality of a state’s incorporation law will
be connected to its quality as a restructuring hub. Because the optimal
bankruptcy venue does not necessarily correlate to the state with the optimal
corporate law, debtors that incorporate in one state to access that state’s
bankruptcy courts may be accepting a suboptimal state of incorporation to
establish the preferred venue. Other debtors may be foregoing access to the best
venue in pursuit of the best state for incorporations.81 Tying venue to
incorporation thus bundles two unrelated goods.
One might challenge the idea that the optimal bankruptcy venue is
independent of the optimal state of incorporation. After all, in a world with broad
venue choice, Delaware still dominates in both categories. The most obvious
link between the two would be that if almost all incorporations were
concentrated in one state, that state would be available to all of those
corporations as a bankruptcy venue, and if the state were small enough, it might
also be consistently neutral with regard to hometown bias. That neutrality and
availability could attract a critical mass of filings, which in turn could feed into
the experience and expertise of the courts in that venue. In that sense, the
common state of incorporation would be associated with quality and expertise,
which could suggest a reason for bundling it with venue.
But this rationale is circular. In that case, venue expertise derives from the
availability of the state of incorporation because the two are bundled. Judicial
neutrality results only because the choice of state is arbitrary. Starting from first
principles, one might assign any arbitrary venue (such as the District of
Wyoming) as universally available and achieve the same benefits without
bundling the state of incorporation and the bankruptcy venue.
The same unbundling principle applies to the requirements that tie
jurisdiction to a firm’s principal place of business or the location of its assets.
Bundling these decisions with venue rules produces wasteful behavior. For
example, under existing rules, firms routinely rent office space in White Plains,
New York, in order to file in the White Plains Division of the Southern District
81
The latter scenario—where debtors merely accept a prescribed venue as a nonnegotiable add-on to a
chosen state of incorporation—is likely the common outcome in reality.
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of New York. Liberal venue rules that encourage debtors to rent office space for
the sole purpose of accessing a convenient venue should be disfavored. It is
entirely possible that White Plains, New York is the ideal bankruptcy venue. But
if that is the case, debtors should be allowed to file there without renting local
office space.
***
The actual story is likely a combination of the scenarios described above.
Debtors probably expend resources and choose bundles in part to avoid biases
and in part to find them. A debtor will expend resources in some cases to find a
venue that will facilitate an efficient resolution for all stakeholders and in some
cases to find a venue that allows it to take advantage of other creditors. And
sometimes a debtor will shop for favorable substantive precedent. These efforts
might waste resources and distort some outcomes while also producing expert
judges who administer cases efficiently. Optimal venue selection rules should
preserve productive venue choice while eliminating wasteful venue shopping
and inefficient bundling.
II. CHAPTER 15 AND CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
In Part III below, we discuss the connection between global forum shopping
and domestic venue reform. But first in this Part, we provide a brief overview of
chapter 15 of the Code, which facilitates global forum shopping by providing
for the domestic recognition and enforcement of foreign bankruptcy
proceedings. We also describe the attractiveness of foreign forums within the
global system of cross-border insolvency and discuss the particular challenges
to regulating or eliminating global foreign shopping.
A. Chapter 15 Recognition of Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings
Cross-border insolvency laws deal with proceedings involving debtors with
assets in multiple jurisdictions. It has long been recognized that the lack of crossborder coordination makes it difficult to restructure an insolvent or financially
distressed debtor with a global presence. Inconsistent judgments, difficulties
with enforcement, and other coordination costs are real concerns. The Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law), which was promulgated in 1997
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
attempted to address this coordination problem.82
82
See In re ABC Learning Centres Ltd., 728 F.3d 301, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing the purpose of
and policy behind the Model Law).
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The Model Law provides generally applicable norms for cross-border
insolvency proceedings and seeks to promote resolution of multinational
bankruptcy proceedings in a single process. Without such rules, debtors would
have to file in a number of jurisdictions simultaneously. That creates a costly
and unwieldy process for debtors and creditors with multiple and, at times,
conflicting proceedings in different countries. The idea behind the Model Law
is to provide a process for an initial court to administer the main proceeding and
other jurisdictions to recognize (and enforce) that.83 In this way, the Model Law
seeks to eliminate the territorialism in cross-border insolvency proceedings.84
For that to work, the recognizing jurisdictions should, as United States courts
generally do, liberally grant recognition to and enforce the initial main
jurisdiction’s foreign proceedings without demanding consistency with the
recognizing jurisdiction’s own local procedural or substantive laws.
By most accounts, the Model Law has been a mild success.85 Currently fiftytwo jurisdictions have adopted laws based in some form on the Model Law.86
Chapter 15 of the Code is based on the Model Law and represents the United
States’ approach to resolving cross-border insolvencies. Under chapter 15,
courts in the United States freely recognize and enforce foreign insolvency
proceedings of companies that have assets that are located in more than one
country.87 By its own terms, chapter 15 was enacted to “provide effective
mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency.”88 It provides for
the recognition and enforcement of a foreign proceeding when a petition is filed
by a representative of the debtor and certain statutory requirements are met.
Relevant to our inquiry is the recognition of “foreign main proceedings.”89
Chapter 15 recognition of a foreign main proceeding provides an affirmative

83

In re Stripes US Holdings Inc. [2018] EWHC (CHD) 3098 [54] (Eng.).
See id.
85
See Wai Yee Wan & Gerard McCormack, Implementing Strategies for the Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency: The Divergence in Asia-Pacific and Lessons for UNICTRAL, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 59, 61–62
(2020) (“The Model Law has achieved moderate success internationally, with major common law jurisdictions
including the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), Australia, and more recently Singapore, having
changed their domestic laws on cross-border insolvency cooperation based on the Model Law provisions.”
(internal citations omitted)).
86
See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Status: UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
(1997), https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/cross-borderinsolvency/status.
87
See 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2019).
88
Id. § 1501.
89
See id. § 1520. “Nonmain” proceedings have less of a connection with the foreign jurisdiction—they
require an “establishment” rather than a center of main interests—and receive a lesser degree of relief in chapter
15. Id. § 1517(b).
84
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mechanism for the debtor to enforce the terms of the foreign proceeding. Perhaps
most importantly, it triggers the automatic stay “with respect to the debtor and
the property of the debtor that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.”90 Further, the debtor can seek additional injunctions barring creditors in
the United States from taking actions that are inconsistent with the foreign
proceeding.91
Chapter 15 provides a mechanism for a debtor to seek the affirmative
assistance of the court in enforcing a judgment obtained in a foreign
proceeding.92 This assistance includes the automatic stay provisions, the issuing
of necessary orders, and the granting of preemptive injunctions. As a result, a
debtor can quickly use chapter 15 to secure a broad order that implements the
terms of the foreign proceeding in the United States. In this way, it has the same
effective domestic scope as a plan of reorganization resulting from chapter 11
proceedings.
Importantly, bankruptcy courts in the United States will enforce broad
provisions of foreign proceedings according to the foreign jurisdiction’s rules.
This is true even when those provisions have significant effects on non-debtors
and even when the United States court would not itself have approved a plan
with such provisions had the case been initially brought before it under chapter
11. As one court noted, “principles of enforcement of foreign judgments and
comity in chapter 15 cases strongly counsel approval of enforcement in the
United States of the third-party non-debtor release and injunction provisions
included in the [Foreign] Orders, even if those provisions could not be entered
in a plenary chapter 11 case.”93 Thus, chapter 15 can expand the debtors’
substantive rights as compared to chapter 11.
To obtain chapter 15 recognition, the debtor’s representative must comply
with certain filing procedures, but substantively there are two key requirements.
First, the foreign proceeding must be:
90

Id. § 1520(a)(1).
For example, available relief includes “staying the commencement or continuation of an individual
action or proceeding concerning the debtor’s assets, rights, obligations or liabilities to the extent they have not
been stayed under section 1520(a).” Id. § 1521(a)(1).
92
In the absence of chapter 15, defensive recognition of a foreign proceeding was and is still possible.
Under general principles of comity, state and federal courts in the United States give preclusive effect to
judgments of a foreign court. The difference is that comity would generally be a shield invoked only after a
creditor took actions that violated the foreign proceedings. This has some value, but without chapter 15,
enforcement of the foreign proceeding might require years of litigation across multiple jurisdictions.
93
In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Inv., 421 B.R. 685, 696 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); see In re Avanti
Commc’ns Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603, 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018); In re Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 701 F.3d 1031,
1041–46 (5th Cir. 2012).
91
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a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign country,
including an interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency or
adjustment of debt in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the
debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the
purpose of reorganization or liquidation.94

Second, the foreign proceeding must qualify as a “main” proceeding, which is
defined as a proceeding that is “pending in the country where the debtor has the
center of its main interests.”95 The Code does not define center of main interests
(COMI), though section 1516(c) stipulates that, “[i]n the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the debtor’s registered office, or habitual residence in the case of
an individual, is presumed to be” the debtor’s COMI.96
When determining the debtor’s COMI for purposes of chapter 15, courts
have considered the location of the firm’s headquarters, employees, assets,
creditors, and which jurisdiction’s law would apply in most disputes.97
Crucially, though, courts have held that the relevant time to determine the
location of the debtor’s COMI is the moment of the chapter 15 petition.98 Thus,
a court will recognize a foreign main proceeding even when a debtor initiated
the foreign proceedings before it took whatever steps were necessary to make
sure that its COMI was located in that jurisdiction.99 The prevailing view is that
the COMI must simply be in the relevant foreign jurisdiction by the time the
debtor files its chapter 15 petition. This occurred, for example, when the
Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York approved, and the
Second Circuit affirmed, a foreign main proceeding in the British Virgin Islands

94
11 U.S.C. § 101(23). This requirement is based on the substance rather than the technical form of the
proceeding. Courts look to the function of the proceeding not its statutory source or the precise financial position
of the debtor. Thus, for example, the fact that an English scheme of arrangement is not formally an insolvency
proceeding is irrelevant as long as it is a collective proceeding aimed at reorganization. See, e.g., In re Avanti
Commc’ns Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603, 613–14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). Indeed, United States courts routinely
recognize schemes of arrangement and similar proceedings under this definition because they adjust the debts
of a class of creditors. While some scholars have argued for a narrower approach that excludes schemes as not
“fully collective,” no United States court has adopted such an approach. See Horst Eidenmueller, What Is an
Insolvency Proceeding? 3 (Euro. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 335/2016, 2016).
95
11 U.S.C. § 1502(4). A nonmain proceeding is still entitled to recognition but the available enforcement
assistance is less powerful. For example, the automatic stay does not apply.
96
Id. § 1516(c).
97
In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In
re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 714 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir. 2013).
98
In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 714 F.3d at 137.
99
There are cases where the change in COMI was deemed to be bad faith, but these turn on whether the
change was actually carried out. In re O’Reilly, 598 B.R. 784, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2019).
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to liquidate an investment fund whose collapse was triggered by the Bernie
Madoff scandal.100
B. Establishing Jurisdiction in the Foreign Forum
Of course, chapter 15 recognition, and thus international forum shopping,
are possible only if alternative forums are accessible to debtors. While chapter
11 has long been seen as the gold standard for large corporate reorganizations,
foreign jurisdictions increasingly permit debtors to restructure in their courts
with only limited connections to the jurisdiction. England, for example, simply
requires that a company possess a “sufficient connection” to England in order
for English courts to have jurisdiction to oversee the scheme.101 English courts
have found a sufficient connection when the company’s COMI102 is in
England,103 but also in broader circumstances such as when the company has
assets in England, when the company carries on activities in England, when
England is the location for restructuring negotiations, or when the debt
instrument is governed by English law.
It is relatively easy for a firm to establish these connections. One option is
to simply relocate its COMI by moving the firm’s office and other affairs to
England. This occurred successfully in the Magyar Telecom, New World
Resources, and VCG schemes.104 Another option is to amend the governing law
and jurisdiction clauses in the contract.105 A more surprising option is to cause
100

See id.
In the matter of Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC (CHD) 1104 (Eng.); In the matter of Tele Columbus
GmbH [2010] EWHC (Ch) 1944 (Eng.); Re La Seda De Barcelona SA [2010] EWHC (Ch) 1364 (Eng.).
102
As a clarification: There are two points of inquiry about COMI. First the issuing court will determine
it as described here. Then the United States bankruptcy court will determine it for purposes chapter 15
recognition, as described above. In each instance the court will apply its own law, though the tests are similar.
103
Re Heron International NV [1994] 1 BCLC 667 (Eng.) (accepting jurisdiction on the basis that the
company had assets in England); Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC (Ch) 1104 (Eng.) (accepting jurisdiction
on the ground that liability was governed by English law); Re Vietnam Shipbuilding Indus. Grp. [2013] EWHC
(Ch) 2476 (Eng.) (finding a “sufficient connection” on the ground that the debtor’s liabilities were governed by
English law); Re APCOA Parking Holdings LmbH and Ors [2014] EWHC 3849 (Eng.) (finding a sufficient
connection after an overseas company took steps to ensure that its governing liabilities would be subject to
English law in order to avail itself of a scheme). The COMI inquiry, which is used to establish jurisdiction in
the European Union, is not completely synonymous with the substantial connection test. See Re Noble Grp. Ltd
[2018] EWHC (Ch) 3092 (Eng.) (discussing the relationship between COMI and the substantial connection test).
104
See Tom Young, DTEK Shifts High-Yield Restructuring Options, INT. FIN. L. REV. (May 19, 2015),
https://www.iflr.com/article/b1lsq9843c6xw7/dtek-shifts-high-yield-restructuring-options; Re Magyar Telecom
BV, [2013] EWHC (Ch) 3800 (Eng.).
105
See Re APCOA Parking Holdings GmbH and others [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3849.The APCOA court did
warn against decisions to change the law when the new choice of law “appears entirely alien to the parties’
previous arrangements and/or with which the parties had no previous connection” or is otherwise a “step too
far.” Id.
101
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an affiliate entity registered in England—one that may have been acquired or
created for this purpose—to become a co-obligor on the relevant debt
instruments.106 The contracts often allow a new entity to voluntarily become an
co-obligor on the underlying debt obligations.107 Having done so, the new
entity—with its COMI in England creating the necessary jurisdiction
connection—can seek sanction for the scheme, the terms of which can affect the
obligations of all parties to the relevant debts instruments.
Singapore, too, is willing to exercise jurisdiction even when the debtor has
only a small connection to the country. Like England, Singapore will find
jurisdiction when the firm’s COMI is in Singapore, when it carries on business
in Singapore, when it is registered as a foreign company in Singapore, when it
selected Singapore law to govern loan transactions, or when it submitted to
Singapore jurisdiction.108 We should note that there is nothing exceptional about
these approaches, and that courts in the United States have long been willing to
exercise jurisdiction even when a firm has only a small connection to the United
States.109
C. The Attractiveness of Foreign Forums
On their own, but especially with the possibility of broad and liberal chapter
15 recognition, foreign courts have become increasingly attractive forums to
restructure debt even for firms with large presences in the United States.110
England, in particular, has emerged as a convenient forum, and Singapore has
also taken steps to attract multinational corporations.111 That is not to say that
these foreign forums are perfect substitutes for the American bankruptcy

106

Re Codere Finance (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC (Ch) 3778 (Eng.).
Id.
108
Re Zetta Jet Pte Ltd and Ors (Asia Aviation Holdings Pte Ltd, intervener) [2019] SGHC 53.
109
Id. at 18.
110
See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 16, at 386–87. There is a lengthy literature on the desirability
of international forum shopping. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of
Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775, 777–78 (1999); Douglas G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy
Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 937–38 (1994); Lynn M. LoPucki,
Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 704 (1999);
Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1997); Jay L.
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 499, 512–13 (1991); John
E. Pottow, The Myth (And Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
785, 786 (2007); Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2177, 2208 (2000); Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276,
2292–93 (2000).
111
Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 16, at 362–74 (describing the emergence of proceedings in
England, the Netherlands, and Singapore as alternatives to chapter 11).
107
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process. Consider, for example, the difference between chapter 11 and the
English scheme of arrangement.
Chapter 11 is a proceeding designed to allow financially distressed
companies to restructure their operations. Its salient features are the automatic
stay, the ability to cram down plans over the objections of some stakeholders,
the ability to reject burdensome contracts, the role for existing management, the
ability to discharge debts that arose before the confirmation date, and the ability
to sell property free and clear of liens, claims, and encumbrances.
The system in England is different. Its formal insolvency law allows debtors
to restructure either through a formal administration or a Company Voluntary
Arrangement (CVA).112 Those options are no less cumbersome or more
attractive to debtors than chapter 11. Administration is a formal process where
a court-appointed trustee takes control of the company in order to facilitate a
recovery by going concern sale or liquidation. A CVA, on the other hand, allows
directors to retain some amount of control over the process, but it is available
only to small firms, cannot bind secured creditors, and requires that 75% of
voting creditors by value agree to the plan. Both options have proven
unpopular—administration because it is controlled by a trustee from the get-go
and CVA because it applies only to small firms and does not bind secured
creditors.
But England offers debtors another more streamlined option—the scheme of
arrangement—to restructure their financial debts, and this option has become
very popular. While schemes are not technically insolvency proceedings—they
are authorized under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 and available to solvent
and insolvent debtors alike—they do offer a flexible way for debtors to
restructure debts and are frequently used by financially distressed firms.113
Unlike chapter 11, there is relatively little judicial oversight of schemes of
arrangement, and they move to resolution quickly. Thus, some of the attractive
features of chapter 11 like the automatic stay do not immediately kick in.114 A
scheme does, however, allow a company to restructure its debt if the proposed
scheme receives support from (a) a majority in number of each class of creditors
112

Insolvency Act of 1986, c. 45 (Eng.), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/45/contents.
There are examples in which large non-English companies have used a scheme of arrangements. See,
e.g., Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC (Ch) 1104 [1]–[3] (Eng.); Primacon Holding GmbH & Anor v. A
Grp. of the Senior Lenders & Credit Agricole [2012] EWHC (Ch) 164 [1]–[2] (Eng.); Re NEF Telecom Co BV
[2012] EWHC (Comm.) 2944 [1], [5] (Eng.); Re Cortefiel SA [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2998 [3], [5] (Eng.); Re Seat
Pagine Gialle SpA [2012] EWHC (Ch) 3686 [1]–[2] (Eng.).
114
Debtors can, however, request that the court approve a stay. See Re Vietnam Shipbuilding Indus. Grp.
[2013] EWHC (Ch) 1146 [1] (Eng.).
113
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that are present and voting, and (b) 75% in value of the debt held by the creditors
of each class present and voting. A debtor cannot cram down a scheme when a
class fails to secure the required votes, but a successful scheme binds all
creditors of the restructured obligations, regardless of whether they voted for or
against the scheme.
Schemes contain attractive features from the perspective of debtors and
creditors. As long as the voting thresholds are met, claims of secured creditors
or bond holders can be reduced or written off without the unanimous consent of
that class of creditors. In addition, the voting thresholds enumerated in the statute
override thresholds in contractual agreements. That means that, even if a
contract requires unanimous consent to adjust the terms of the contract, a debtor
need only secure agreement from 75% (by value) in order to renegotiate terms.
These provisions reduce the holdout problem, and they facilitate negotiations
even when some creditors do not agree to go along.
While not a perfect substitute for chapter 11, schemes are appealing to
debtors who want to restructure their debt obligations because they can be
negotiated in advance and often at lower costs than traditional chapter 11
reorganizations. In the past decade, the number of distressed firms restructuring
in England has increased dramatically such that the scheme is now perceived to
be a viable alternative to chapter 11 for some debtors who want to restructure
their contractual obligations quickly.115
New developments from 2020 are likely to further increase the desirability
of England as a forum. The Company Insolvency Act of 2020 has expanded the
relief available to debtors. In particular, it implemented a new insolvency
proceeding (referred to as a Restructuring Plan) that essentially adds a right of
cross-class cramdown116 to the scheme of arrangement. The new law also
provides for a twenty-day moratorium at the outset of the case.117
These developments suggest that England may be willing to adopt additional
tools that would make it an even more convenient venue for financially

115
The Rise and Rise of the English Scheme of Arrangement, ALLEN & OVERY (Dec. 21, 2015), https://
www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/publications/the-rise-and-rise-of-the-english-scheme-ofarrangement.
116
The cramdown rules require that one class vote in favor of the restructuring plan and that every other
class does no worse than it would have done under the “relevant alternative.” Of note, the law does not appear
to require that the plan comply with absolute priority. See In re United Marine, 197 B.R. 942, 948 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1996).
117
Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, A9 c. 3; 13c, c. 3, (Eng.), https://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2020/12/enacted.
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distressed debtors.118 And this willingness to change the law to attract debtors is
not limited to England. For example, Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany are
trying to develop “credible alternatives” in response to the popularity of the
English scheme.119
Mexico and Canada have also developed attractive reorganization laws, but
Singapore in particular has instituted and continues to update an extremely
convenient set of rules for financially distressed firms, combining features of
chapter 11 with the advantages of schemes.120 As noted, debtors can reorganize
in Singapore if they have a “substantial connection” to the country. As in
England, that threshold can be met if a company has substantial assets in
Singapore, conducts business in the country, or possesses assets that are
governed by Singaporean law.121
Singapore has also made substantive reforms that make it appealing to
distressed debtors. Singaporean law, for example, provides super-priority to
debtor-in-possession financing, a global moratorium on debt collection efforts
that resembles the Code’s automatic stay, a cramdown mechanism, and
procedures for approving prepackaged schemes.122
Again, these foreign jurisdictions do not offer perfect substitutes for chapter
11, and debtors in some types of cases might be more likely than in others to
forum shop. The English scheme, for example, is generally a useful tool for
resolving intra-class holdout problems and is commonly used to facilitate
restructurings involving financial creditors. It is less useful for a debtor seeking
a full operational reorganization or one seeking to restructure labor contracts or
discharge environmental obligations. This may limit the flight of American
debtors seeking to restructuring in England.

118
United States Courts have already recognized plans under the new statute. See, e.g., Order Granting
Recognition and Related Relief at 5, In re Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2020) (No.
20-11804); Provisional Relief Order at 3–4, In re Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020)
(No. 20-11804); Order Granting Related Relief at 3–5, In re PizzaExpress Financing 2 PLC (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Oct. 5, 2020) (No. 4:20bk34868).
119
See The Rise and Rise of the English Scheme of Arrangement, ALLEN & OVERY (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/publications/the-rise-and-rise-of-the-englishscheme-of-arrangement; Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 16, at 366–74 (noting the emergence of Dutch and
Signaporean options in addition to English proceedings).
120
See Gerard McComack & Wai Yee Wan, Transporting Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code into
Singapore’s Insolvency Laws: Opportunities and Challenges, 1 J. OF CORP. L. STUD. 69, 81 (2017).
121
Re Zetta Jet Pte Ltd and Ors (Asia Aviation Holdings Pte Ltd, intervener) [2019] SGHC 53.
122
In another move that will make Singapore a more attractive forum, the Singapore Supreme Court
recently approved the use of roll-ups in debtor in possession financing. See Re Design Studio Grp. Ltd and Other
Matters [2020] SGHC 148 [1], [6]. We discuss roll-ups more, infra Part III.
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But one cannot count on that always being true. The addition of cross-class
cramdown provisions in 2020 will make England an attractive forum for a
broader set of debtors. And as England—or Singapore, the Netherlands, or some
other jurisdiction—continues to innovate, it will attract more cases. The judges
in that jurisdiction, like those in Delaware in the 1990s, will then become more
experienced and predictable. This is likely to draw even more cases and
encourage even further innovation across broader dimensions. And so on.
In the end, the increasing convenience of global bankruptcy forums,
combined with the chapter 15’s liberal recognition of foreign proceedings,
suggests that debtors that are dissatisfied with the American bankruptcy process
may find it relatively straightforward to reorganize in forums outside of the
United States. The availability of those forums is likely to increase, and while
some countries will race to the top, it is reasonable to expect others to race to the
bottom with by with laws that transfer value to managers and provide
opportunities for debtor opportunism.
D. Forum Reform
One might respond to global forum shopping with proposals to eliminate or
reduce debtors’ access to foreign jurisdictions.123 But that approach faces several
challenges that are not present when regulating domestic venue. First, it would
be difficult to enforce domestic rules that dictated a specific forum for a crossborder proceeding. Second, and more importantly, even when enforceable, such
rules would impose extreme costs by disrupting the global cross-border
insolvency systems.
A domestic law attempting to cut off debtors’ forum shopping opportunities
might take various forms. A law instructing certain debtors to file domestically
alone would be ineffective. As long as foreign jurisdictions welcome debtors
and chapter 15 remains in effect, nothing would have changed. A solution then
requires at least a change to chapter 15’s recognition rules. Perhaps this change
could take the form of a full repeal or an amendment to limit the cases that are
entitled to recognition. For example, an amendment to the definition of COMI
could provide an ‘American COMI’ for any debtor with significant assets and

123
LoPucki himself has suggested that international forum shopping could recreate the same problems as
domestic venue shopping, but, to our knowledge, none of the advocates of bankruptcy venue reform has
considered how the availability of foreign venues would interact with domestic venue reforms. See LoPucki,
supra note 110, at 728; cf. In re Agrokor d.d., 591 B.R. 163, 167 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining the English
Gibbs rule, which attempts to limit access to non-English forums by prohibiting recognition in England of
foreign proceedings that affect any debt governed by English law).
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affiliates in the United States. Such debtors could not qualify for foreign main
proceedings, thus limiting the relief available under chapter 15.
Still, that would not fully eliminate the accessibility of foreign forums. Even
before and without chapter 15, state and federal courts in the United States have
applied general principles of comity to recognize and enforce foreign
proceedings. And they have stated that such comity is especially appropriate for
foreign insolvency proceedings. This recognition is usually defensive in nature.
The debtor can point to the foreign proceedings in litigation after a creditor has
taken action that violates those proceedings. This is less attractive than the
preemptive injunctions available through chapter 15, but debtors do still pursue
this avenue of relief in some cases.124 Thus, a repeal of chapter 15 or a new
definition of COMI would make recognition harder to secure but would not
eliminate the possibility altogether. Elimination would require an extreme rule
altogether prohibiting state and federal courts from recognizing certain foreign
judgments.
Additionally, such laws, if enforceable, could push some debtors to shift
assets abroad to avoid the law’s reach. Prohibiting recognition would do little to
deter international foreign shopping if multinational corporations simply moved
their headquarters and assets abroad to take advantage of more convenient
restructuring forums. Those moves might be rare given the costs of moving
assets, but firms have undertaken similar avoidance strategies in other contexts
such as tax structuring.
Most troubling, however, is that a broad nonrecognition rule could upend the
entire emerging global system of cross-border insolvency.125 Other jurisdictions
might respond with strategic retaliatory measures. Each country would have an
incentive to require that multinational firms use that country’s bankruptcy
processes to restructure any assets located within its jurisdiction. Corporations
that are active in multiple countries would be forced to go through multiple
bankruptcy processes with conflicting results whenever they are in financial

124
See Barclays Bank PLC v. Kemsley, 992 N.Y.S.2d 602, 607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (state court
recognizing a foreign proceeding under general principles of comity after a bankruptcy judge had rejected
recognition because the foreign case was neither a foreign main nor foreign nonmain proceeding); EMA GARP
Fund v. Banro Corp., 18 Civ. 1986 (KPF), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27387, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2019)
(granting recognition under general principles of comity in the absence of any chapter 15 proceeding).
125
See Pottow, supra note 110, at 787 (arguing that a territorialist approach to cross-border insolvencies
would undermine predictability and encourage “inter-system arbitrage between territorialist and universalist
courts”); LoPucki, Courting Failure Book Summary, supra note 39, at 336–37; Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism
Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 160–61 (2005); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality
in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 , 2217 (2000).
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distress—precisely the outcome the Model Law was trying to avoid. Attempts
of this sort to limit international forum shopping could therefore make crossborder insolvencies less efficient and strike a major blow to global financial
markets, defeating the core purpose of the Model Law.
An alternative approach, which we advocate below, is to address forum
reform along with venue reform through substantive amendments and
precommitment mechanisms.
III. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN GLOBAL FORUM SHOPPING, DOMESTIC
VENUE SHOPPING, AND CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS
Domestic venue rules look different in a world where parties can opt for a
foreign forum if they don’t like the prescribed domestic venue. Reforms that
restrict a debtor’s domestic choice will replace the venue race—to the extent one
exists—with a much costlier global forum war. The result will not be a
redistribution of cases among districts in the United States, but rather the
dissemination of cases to foreign jurisdictions that more openly and directly
compete for cases with debtor-friendly procedural and substantive rules. Such
limitations would in some cases push debtors to restructure in places like
England, Singapore, Canada, or Mexico. And as those jurisdictions see the
opportunity, they will take more aggressive steps to attract debtors.126 In this
way, venue reform runs the risk of trading mild venue shopping for much more
significant forum shopping.
Reform proposals to limit a debtor’s choice of domestic venue ignore this
problem. Consider, for example, debtors who choose venue based on judicial
expertise and predictability. Those debtors may view access to that expertise and
predictability as the most attractive feature of chapter 11. Cutting off access to
126
This is not a merely theoretical conjecture. Consider the Irish response to Brexit. The United
Kingdom’s move to exit the European Union was a rare example of a jurisdiction taking action that limits the
attractiveness of its own insolvency courts. Obviously, larger political forces were at play, but Brexit reduced
the enforceability of United Kingdom schemes throughout Europe. The opportunity this move creates for other
jurisdictions was not lost on Irish insolvency lawyers. The American Bankruptcy Institute’s Thirteenth
International Insolvency & Restructuring Symposium was entitled, “Dublin – Open for Business,” and included
several articles by Irish lawyers that included the following headlines and quotes about the effect of Brexit on
Irish schemes of arrangement: “Barry Cahir Sees a Big Future for Ireland’s Scheme”; “Meanwhile the Irish
Scheme offers a genuine alternative. ‘We need to tell our foreign colleagues about that,’ said [Jane] Marshall.”;
“McAteer Sings the Praises of the Irish Scheme”; “[With Brexit] lawyers in Dublin are pushing Irish Schemes
as a viable alternative.” Symposium, 13th International Insolvency & Restructuring Symposium: Dublin – Open
for Business, AM. BANKR. INST. (Oct. 19–20, 2017). One should expect a similar reaction from forums around
the world if the United States limits domestic venue choice. It is hardly a stretch to imagine headlines touting
the availability of foreign jurisdictions that replicate the lost benefits of Delaware or New York.
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judges that specialize in large chapter 11 cases would make chapter 11—which
is generally more costly than foreign proceedings—less attractive. At some
point, those costs will not be worth it. The same debtor who was willing to bear
those costs in the Southern District of New York may not be willing to do so in
a less predictable venue.
For other debtors who choose venue based on differences in legal precedent,
reforms that reduce venue options will just push them to the global system. A
debtor who cannot access the favored law in Delaware may seek it in the
Netherlands. And while domestic venues are constrained in their ability to
change legal precedents, foreign forums are not. While Delaware cannot
unilaterally adopt a different bankruptcy code than California, the Netherlands
certainly can.127
As a concrete example, consider the issue of roll-ups in debtor-in-possession
financing. A roll-up is a special provision in a post-petition financing transaction
that can convey a priority benefit to certain creditors.128 Roll-ups are important
to debtors who are negotiating with sophisticated creditors to secure crucial postpetition financing. But they are also controversial because they provide
opportunities for abuse.129
Different venues in the United States take different approaches to allowing
roll-ups. Approaches abroad differ as well, and in a recent case, the Singapore
Supreme Court, citing authority from the Southern District of New York,
approved the use of roll-ups in debtor-in-possession financing.130
This presents a situation where well-intentioned domestic venue reform
could backfire. To the extent that a debtor would choose a venue in order to
secure favorable law on this topic, that represents the worst form of forum
shopping. But attempts to solve the problem by restricting venue choice will
push the debtor abroad. If the debtor is told that it cannot shop for the domestic
venue that favors roll-ups, it might instead shop for the foreign forum that does.
127
In this way, international bankruptcy forum shopping looks more like the domestic incorporation races,
where each state can create its own corporations’ laws. See supra note 110.
128
With a roll-up, a post-petition loan from a creditor is conditioned upon using some of the new funds to
pay off pre-petition loans held by that same creditor. The result is that the pre-petition loan is rolled into the
post-petition loan and receives special payment priority. Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy
Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1246–47 (2013).
129
See AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 77–78 (2014); Cliff
White, Director, U.S. Trustee Program, Remarks Before The Delaware Bankruptcy American Inn of Court
(2018) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/ust/speech/remarks-director-cliff-white-delaware-bankruptcyamerican-inn-court).
130
Re Design Studio Group Ltd and Other Matters [2020] SGHC 148 [4].
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If the debtor is denied access to the Southern District of New York, it can go to
Singapore—instead of the less favored United States venue that was
prescribed—to secure the same substantive outcome that would have been
available in New York.
And while Singapore is one of the most sophisticated and efficient forums
for insolvency proceedings in the world, that may not be true of the next forum
to enter the fray. Sensing an opportunity to attract debtors in light of restrictive
venue rules, another jurisdiction may attempt to do so with substantive rules that
directly transfer value to the debtor’s managers. The costs of that scenario could
be high: jurisdictions will waste resources on attracting debtors; debtors will
waste resources on establishing jurisdictional connections; creditors will waste
resources trying to prevent the debtor from making those connections; and
creditors will raise the ex ante cost of capital in anticipation of ex poste value
transfers.
Apart from these direct costs of global forum shopping, the shift described
above could also have wide ranging indirect costs. For instance, proposals
limiting a debtor’s choice of venue but not forum will have a disproportionate
impact on small businesses. Because smaller firms are less likely to have access
to foreign forums, they will have less opportunity to file abroad. A small firm
might be stuck in its local district while a large, multinational firm can shop
among various forums, thus providing an additional competitive advantage to
large firms.131

131
Other indirect effects of venue reform and its interactions with other bankruptcy laws may also be
worth considering. For instance, venue reform with regard to chapter 11 may have implications with regard to
individual chapter 13 cases. Large corporate cases take up a judge’s time and require different judicial skills and
expertise than individual cases. Time spent deciding large corporate cases is time not spent on chapter 13 cases.
And the expertise gained is not fully transferable. In some districts that is not a major concern. In Delaware there
are not many chapter 13 cases. And even the Southern District of New York has a relatively low number of
chapter 13 cases. Chicago and Atlanta present entirely different stories. In 2019, the District of Delaware (DD)
had 860 chapter 13 cases while the Northern District of Illinois (NDIL) had 15,718 and the Northern District of
Georgia (NDG) had 14,172. See AM. BANKR. INST., DECEMBER 2019 BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS – STATE AND
DISTRICT (database updated 2020), https://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics?page=4. These three
jurisdictions have roughly the same number of judges (DD and NDG have eight judgeships and NDIL has
eleven). With significant venue reform moving cases out of Delaware and into courts like the Northern District
of Illinois, Delaware would no doubt lose judgeships and the Northern District of Illinois will need to gain them.
But more fundamentally the nature of the caseloads and the necessary expertise to decide those cases would
dramatically shift for all courts.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE REFORMS FOR BANKRUPTCY VENUE AND FORUM
SHOPPING
In our view, optimal venue reform should be based on two principles. First,
for those instances where parties are forum shopping to take advantage of
inconsistent substantive law—such as that which occurred in CEOC—the most
direct reform available is to eliminate the inconsistency by amending the
substantive provisions of the Code.132 A second, more comprehensive reform
would facilitate ex ante commitment to mechanisms for choosing venue and
forum. This would likely involve the debtor selecting a default venue and
establishing creditor voting rules to alter the default. These principles should
guide all venue reform—even when foreign forums are unavailable—but they
gain special importance when global forum shopping is part of the equation.
Because the principles are equally applicable to domestic venue and
international forum choices, we suggest that similar reforms be implemented
with regard to foreign forums in tandem with any domestic venue reforms.
A. Amend Substantive Bankruptcy Law
The first idea is straightforward and has been discussed by others,133 so we
deal with it quickly. As noted above, a particularly problematic form of venue
shopping occurs when debtors shop for favorable legal precedent. This problem
can be resolved without forcing debtors to file in their home districts. If debtors
seek out bankruptcy courts that have legal precedents that favor a particular class
of claimants, then reforms should directly amend the substantive provisions of
the Code that permit such outcomes. For example, if inconsistent law on thirdparty releases drives debtors to the Northern District of Illinois and creditors
with an involuntary petition to Delaware, as in the CEOC bankruptcy, then the
simplest legislative venue reform is to amend the Code to clarify the law on
third-party releases. Alternatively, where a circuit split leads to strategic filings,
the Supreme Court can also step in to resolve the split.
Such reforms are particularly important when it comes to nonadjusting
creditors, such as tort victims. Debtors and sophisticated creditors might collude
to choose venues that transfer value from nonadjusting creditors to other

132
This is the legislative solution. A judicial version of this is for the Supreme Court of the United States
to definitively resolve circuit splits and open questions of law. See Karen M. Gebbia, Certiorari and the
Bankruptcy Code: The Statutory Interpretation Cases, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 503, 510 (2016).
133
See, e.g., Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 9, at 1358; Zywicki, supra note 36, at 1189.
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stakeholders.134 Regardless of how infrequent this problem is, the
precommittment solutions discussed below cannot mitigate the harm for
nonadjusting creditors because those solutions rely on markets and therefore fail
to constrain behavior harming creditors who do not engage in market
interactions with the debtor or the other stakeholders. Legislatures and courts
should therefore make it a first priority to clearly and quickly resolve
inconsistencies that affect the substantive rights of nonadjusting creditors.135
One objection to this focus on resolving substantive inconsistencies might
be that it is unrealistic—that circuit splits are inevitable. The response to this
objection turns on one’s faith in the Supreme Court and in Congress. While
Congress and the Supreme Court may not always resolve such splits, that does
not mean they categorically refuse to do so.136 In fact, the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to resolve circuit splits in a number of bankruptcy cases in the
past few years.137 Congress, too, has repeatedly amended the Code. In fact,
amendments to the Code in 2005 specifically addressed several of the practices
that LoPucki had identified as driving venue shopping.138 On the other hand,
several substantive splits have remained unresolved for years and, in some cases,
decades.
The real question is whether these solutions are more or less achievable than
the alternative venue reform. After all, it may be easier for Congress to regularly
amend provisions of the Code dealing with vendor orders, third-party releases,
and executory contracts than it is to reach a political compromise on meaningful
and successful venue reform.139 Those substantive provisions of the Code are
134
This is also relevant when bankruptcy law alters non-bankruptcy entitlements. See Anthony J. Casey
& Joshua C. Macey, The Hertz Maneuver (and the Limits of Bankruptcy Law), 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE *1,
*14–15 (2020).
135
One of us has recently suggested one way to protect nonadjusting creditors. See Vincent S. J. Buccola
& Joshua C. Macey, Claim Durability and Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL. 766, 770, 795–
809 (2021) (proposing a “super-durability norm” that would produce similar effects to a super-priority rule for
tort claimants); Joshua C. Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and
the Limits of Chapter 11, 71 STAN. L. REV. 879, 888 (2019) (analyzing the nonadjusting creditor problem in the
context of coal mine bankruptcies). We discuss this again in the global forum context. See infra page 505–07.
136
Whether they reach the substantively right outcomes is another matter.
137
See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 982 (2017); Rodriguez v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 140 S. Ct. 713, 714 (2020); Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct.
1649, 1656 (2020); City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 589 (2021).
138
Zywicki, supra note 36, at 1192–94 (discussing various amendments of this nature). There is
considerable debate about whether the amendments were appropriate or successful. Our point is simply that
Congress was able to legislate with respect to the relevant substantive issues.
139
Here we are talking about resolving substantive inconsistencies as a reform to reduce domestic venue
shopping. To the extent such substantive measures also create or eliminate inconsistencies between the United
States and foreign forums, they can reduce or increase certain types of global forum shopping. These ancillary
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hardly salient topics, and intricacies of corporate bankruptcy law do not usually
get politicians and voters worked up. The same cannot be said of venue reform.
The local and regional interests in venue are strong and they cross party lines in
unusual ways. Professional associations, judges, and others will be sure their
voices are heard. These battle lines have been drawn for quite some time. This
in part explains why venue reform has seen so little action despite so many calls
for reform over the last two decades.
In the end, we are left to guess at whether case law, substantive legislation,
or venue legislation is most feasible. The main point of our project here is to lay
out principles and tools for ideal venue and forum rules rather than prescribe the
political means of implementing them.140
B. Precommitment to a Choice Mechanism
Many existing venue reforms would eliminate both good and bad venue
shopping. Forcing debtors to file in their local districts will prevent opportunistic
venue shopping designed to skirt regulatory obligations and benefit incumbent
management, but it will also prevent debtors from availing themselves of judges
who have experience resolving large and complicated cases or avoiding local
biases that distort cases.141
A superior approach is to develop tools that allow parties to retain the
benefits of choice while eliminating the incentives for opportunistic shopping.
Allowing debtors to precommit to a mechanism for choosing venue would
accomplish this goal. The idea builds on the work of Professors Robert
Rasmussen and Randall Thomas.142 In 2000, they proposed allowing a debtor to
effects should be considered in evaluating reforms.
140
Any attempt to temper the principles based on judgments of institutional feasibility quickly complicates
things and may run into an inside/outside fallacy. See generally Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or
Outside the System 2 (Uni. of Chi., Working Paper No. 422, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2232153 (describing the inside/outside fallacy as occurring “when the theorist equivocates
between the external standpoint of an analyst of the constitutional order, such as political scientist, and the
internal standpoint of an actor within the system, such as a judge . . . .”).
141
LoPucki has acknowledged this issue, stating:
One problem with requiring companies to file in their local bankruptcy courts is that few of those
local courts would have much expertise in the reorganization of large public companies. To put
the same point another way, the big-case expertise of the American bankruptcy courts would be
spread among so many judges that few or none could develop substantial expertise.
LOPUCKI, supra note 4, at 252–53. LoPucki therefore proposes the establishment of specialized courts to resolve
the larges cases. See LOPUCKI, supra note 4, at 252–53. This might make judges experienced, but it would
eliminate any benefits of competition.
142
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 9, at 1357.
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precommit to a specific venue in its corporate charter.143 Rasmussen and Thomas
argued that ex ante timing was key and that precommiting to a venue prior to
distress, “when the firm seeks capital in the financial markets,” would give
managers “an incentive to select the venue which promises to maximize the
value of the firm as a whole.”144
This proposal has clear advantages over the current system. If firms can
precommit to a bankruptcy venue, then other stakeholders will push them to
choose efficient venues and will pay a premium (in the form of reduced capital
costs) to firms that do. That preserves good venue competition because ex ante
(before their litigation positions are set) stakeholders who can bargain freely will
collectively prefer efficient venues with expert judges that maximize the value
of the estate.145
There are, however, several drawbacks to their proposal. The first is rigidity.
Sometimes the situations of the stakeholders change. And many stakeholders
enter their relationship with the debtor at different points in time. Moreover, an
ex ante choice leads to uncertainty as a particular venue can become more or
less attractive after a firm has precommited to that venue. To the extent the
parties negotiated a venue choice based on the expertise of a particular judge or
the efficiency track record of a particular venue, that decision may become
outdated. Judges may retire or districts may become backlogged. New
precedents may make a formerly attractive venue inconvenient. In short, as the
world changes and venues compete for excellence, new choices will become
optimal. When any of these things are true, the debtor and the stakeholders might
all prefer to negotiate to a new venue choice.
Rasmussen and Thomas foresee this objection and propose that the debtor
be allowed to change venue commitment by amending its charter with the
consent of a majority of its creditors and shareholders.146 The problem with that
proposal is that it creates an arbitrarily high bar that would make it extremely
143

Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 9, at 1357.
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 9, at 1397.
145
The market nature of the solution assumes ex ante bargaining is possible. To the extent that the parties
cannot adequately bargain to a suitable contract over venue, the solution might fail. See Anthony J. Casey,
Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose of Corporate Bankruptcy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1709,
1719 (2020). But there are reasons to think that bargaining and contracting will be sufficient here. First, the
options are discrete and easily defined. Second, breach is easily observable and verifiable. Third, the bargaining
need not be perfect. It need only do better than the alternative venue rules. We are comparing this bargain to a
system where a debtor has unfettered ex post choice or a system where the legislature dictates an arbitrary venue.
Finally, if ex ante agreements cannot be completely drawn, the parties might precommit to a mechanism that
allows a neutral outsider to select or oversee the selection of a bankruptcy venue.
146
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 9, at 1403.
144
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difficult to change from the originally chosen venue. Each group—management,
creditors, and shareholders—would have an effective veto over amendment.
The idea seems to be that there is value in making the ex ante negotiated
venue into a sticky default. But this can create problems of its own. Sticky
defaults create veto rights that provide opportunities for strategic hold out. For
instance, out-of-the-money shareholders would likely object to any attempt to
switch to an efficient forum without some payoff. Additionally, management
may collude with a majority of creditors and shareholders to extract value from
the minority.
Perhaps the voting rule Rasmussen and Thomas propose is sensible. But
there is no reason to think it is optimal. It might be better to give the vote
exclusively to the creditors. Rasmussen and Thomas reject this idea because
creditors have the wrong incentives at the time of filing. But the same is true of
shareholders and managers.147 And even if the rule Rasmussen and Thomas
propose is optimal in some cases, stakeholders and firms are heterogenous. They
have different preferences and characteristics and face different circumstances,
all of which might be relevant in determining the optimal voting rule. A voting
rule may be appropriate in one situation or for one firm but not in another.
Because of these differences, it is likely that the optimal system would allow for
different choice mechanisms tailored to a specific firm.
Recognizing this, the precommitment to a default venue becomes less
important than choosing the right voting rule or choice mechanism to alter the
original choice. But it is difficult for lawmakers to identify the perfect choice
mechanism, and no one rule can fully eliminate the threat of self-interested
action at the time of filing.
Thus, unlike Rasmussen and Thomas, who would allow parties to precommit
to a venue, we would allow parties to precommit to a mechanism for choosing
(and later amending the choice of) venue. Just as the ex ante market players can
efficiently assess the value of venue options, those market players might also
better assess potential hold-up threats associated with locking in a venue choice.
In this way, debtors would stipulate to venue-choice rules in their charter (or
some other public document). They might choose a default rule subject to
majority voting or supermajority voting; they might set their initial choice in
stone; or they might opt for the status quo in which debtors are given wide
discretion to choose the venue. The point is that the debtor precommits to the
147

Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 9, at 1403–06
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rule, and because the commitment is public, the creditors will price that rule into
their contracts with the firm pushing debtors to choose the efficient rule.
As for amendment, the debtor would also select the voting rules for
amending the choice rule. Thus, the debtor could grant its board of directors the
right to choose venue but also provide that the rule can be amended by a
supermajority of one class of creditors. Or the debtor could provide that a
majority of creditors must vote on venue and that a majority of the same creditors
has the right to amend the rule. The point is that the rules are entirely determined
by the debtor ex ante.
The rationale underlying the Rasmussen and Thomas proposal is even more
compelling under this approach. A debtor that precommits to a selection
mechanism is not forced to lock into a venue that may become inconvenient if,
for example, judges retire or circuit precedent changes. And that debtor can be
expected to allocate the voting rights to minimize the likelihood of ex post value
destroying hold-up because doing so will lower its cost of capital.148 Because
creditors will pay a premium for an efficient venue selection mechanism, firms
will have a financial incentive to select a process that discourages opportunism
and holdup.
This proposal would preserve the benefits of venue choice while providing
a market check on opportunistic venue shopping. It gives parties more flexibility
than Rasmussen’s and Thomas’s proposal and more flexibility than the status
quo and existing reform proposals. That flexibility will become even more
important as global forums become more convenient because—as we have noted
throughout—measures that limit flexibility run the risk of pushing debtors to the
global market for bankruptcy forums. That result is exactly the opposite of the
result intended with venue reform.
C. Similar Reforms for Global Forum Shopping
1. Precommitment
On its own, the precommitment mechanism we propose is superior to other
venue reform proposals. This is true regardless of whether venue shopping is a
large or small problem or no problem at all, and regardless whether or not
debtors are in a position to shop for foreign forums. It would be preferable,
though, if foreign jurisdictions adopted similar reforms with regard to the choice
148
Nonadjusting creditors such as tort victims remain a problem for this proposal, as they do for most
bankruptcy design problems.
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of global forum. The logic is the same, although the specific enforcement
measures and effects are different in nuanced ways. We turn to global forum
reform now.
Indeed, if global forum shopping is not taken into account, the reforms
discussed above might drive some debtors to file abroad to avoid the effects of
the mechanisms they chose ex post. As with venue, this choice could be good or
bad. The good version would be that they reject the domestic venue to which
their precommitment points in favor of a more efficient foreign forum.. The bad
version is that the managers make a unilateral ex post move to seek the global
forum that is most favorable to management’s interests. The latter is more likely
given the unilateral nature of the decision.
But the problem can be mitigated by allowing the parties to also agree to
include foreign forums in their choice mechanism. In this way, their choice
mechanism would point to both the appropriate venue(s) and the appropriate
forum(s),149 and it could include terms for amending the choice process for
venue or forum or both.
The enforcement of such a provision will, however, look very different for
global forums than it does for a domestic venue. In a perfect world, all global
jurisdictions would enforce these forum-choice provisions on the same terms.
But enforcement is more difficult when forums apply—as they likely will—
different standards of enforcement. The easiest choices to enforce would be
those pointing outside the United States. Bankruptcy law could simply require
dismissal of any chapter 11 case that by the terms of the choice mechanism
should have been filed in a foreign forum.
Things are more complicated when the provision points to the United States
or excludes one foreign forum in favor of another. The difficulty is that even if
the forum choice were enforceable under United States law, a court in an
excluded jurisdiction might ignore the precommitment and take the case. Under
the current rules for recognition of foreign proceedings—under both chapter 15
and general rules of comity—the judgments and orders of that court would likely
be entitled to recognition and enforcement in a subsequent proceeding in the
United States. This is true despite the fact that the issuing forum ignored a
contract that was otherwise enforceable under United States law.

149

Such provisions could give debtors the choice among several venues and several forums.

CASEYMACEY_6.17.21

2021]

6/17/2021 2:51 PM

BANKRUPTCY SHOPPING

503

To solve this, United States courts could refuse to recognize any judgment
issued in violation of the choice mechanism.150 Thus, if the mechanism pointed
to the United States as the required forum, a United States court would refuse to
recognize an English scheme of arrangement initiated by the debtor. Likewise,
if the mechanism pointed to Singapore, a United States court would recognize
proceedings in Singapore but not proceedings in England.151
One might object that this approach would conflict with chapter 15’s comity
principles.152 If some forums ignore the choice mechanisms while the United
States insists on enforcement, debtors might have to pursue parallel proceedings.
But this is not the likely outcome, at least not for debtors with significant assets
in the United States. In those cases, debtors are likely to comply with the choice
mechanism in order to secure enforcement in the United States.153
2. Amend Substantive Bankruptcy Law
A frequent argument for domestic venue reform is that managers and
creditors can choose jurisdictions in order to extract value from nonadjusting
creditors. While not every case involves nonadjusting creditors, cases that do
present a risk of opportunistic venue shopping. Above we discussed the
importance of quick and clear substantive reforms to reduce the potential for this
form of opportunism.

150
This is akin to the treatment of forum selection clauses in general litigation. Existing and proposed
rules and statutes often allow or require courts to refuse recognition of foreign judgments that are inconsistent
with forum selection clauses. But these rules do not usually cover insolvency proceedings, where multiparty
public mechanisms for forum choice of the type described here have not been previously available. See In re
Gercke, 122 B.R. 621, 632 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991) (“But the intervention of insolvency proceedings requires the
mandatory venue clause to yield to considerations of comity and the interests of all creditors of Dominion’s
estate in an equality of distribution.”); In re Northshore Mainland Servs. Inc., 537 B.R. 192, 206 (Bankr. D. Del.
2015) (declining to a enforce a two-party venue selection clause in an insolvency proceeding); Richard Levin &
Carl N. Wedoff, What Did You Expect? Insolvency Forum Clauses, 35 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 22–23 (2016)
(proposing that parties adopt special insolvency forum clauses).
151
As a separate point, the committed choice mechanism could also point to a specific venue for the
chapter 15 proceedings. A choice mechanism might require the debtor to seek recognition in the Southern
District of New York rather than the District of Delaware or vice versa. The general analysis and our proposals
for reform are the same here as they are for venue in chapter 11 filings more generally. But note that the existing
venue rules are different for chapter 11 and chapter 15. See supra note 4. Compare 28 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West),
with id. § 1410.
152
See supra page 492.
153
This is different from the outcome when there is an outright ban on recognition of foreign proceedings.
See supra page 492. With an outright ban, the debtor is deprived of all possibility of cross-border recognition
and is likely to pursue parallel proceedings in multiple jurisdictions because it has no other option. Here, the
nonrecognition is narrowly tied to the choice mechanism and the debtor is still allowed to shop for a forum and
seek recognition according to the terms of the choice mechanism, which it will, itself, have selected ex ante.
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The same problem arises in the context of global forum shopping. But the
appropriate reform measures are more complicated. No legislative body or court
can definitively resolve substantive inconsistencies that exist across
international borders. The United States cannot change the law in Singapore, and
Singapore cannot change the law in the United States. At best, when
inconsistencies exist, one forum’s lawmakers or courts could attempt to achieve
uniformity by fully mimicking the laws of the competing forum. But few forums
would commit to a form of consistency that essentially cedes lawmaking
authority to a foreign jurisdiction. Such a move might also set off a full-out
forum war with each jurisdiction competing itself to the pro-managerial bottom.
What to do? The key is to tie substantive consistency to the law of
recognition. While the United States cannot force consistency across
jurisdictions, it can require certain consistency as a condition of recognition.154
To be clear, this is a drastic measure and—for reasons discussed in Part II—
should be used sparingly, but it could be effectively deployed when it comes to
nonadjusting creditors. The rationale behind the measure is that nonadjusting
creditors do not have a say in designing the ex ante choice mechanism and often
may not have a voice in any subsequent decisions to implement or amend the
mechanism. As such, it is problematic to bind these creditors to a forum choice
that disadvantages them. Moreover, the United States has an interest in
protecting domestic nonadjusting creditors from opportunistic forum shopping
in cases that would otherwise have been brought in the United States.
The solution to this problem is to prohibit recognition of a foreign
proceeding when: (1) the proceeding affects the rights of domestic nonadjusting
creditors; (2) those rights were affected such that the nonadjusting creditors
would have been better off if the case had been brought in a United States forum;
and (3) the United States would have been the appropriate default forum absent
the choice mechanism.
To implement this rule, we would need to define some terms. First, of course,
is the question of who counts as a nonadjusting creditor. This is a decades-old
debate. We are confident that most tort and environmental victims fall into this
category, but we do not attempt a further definition here. For now, we just note
that the reform we propose requires a definitive statement—by legislation or by
Supreme Court precedent—on the matter.

154
The case In re Vitro might be viewed as a United States court doing this. The court drew a line at forum
shopping to take advantage of a legal inconsistency that allows insiders to vote for their own releases. See In re
Vitro SAB De CV, 701 F.3d 1031, 1053 (5th Cir. 2012).
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Second, to determine whether the creditor is worse off, a court will have to
determine what rights and payments these particular creditors would have
received had the proceedings been initiated in a United States court.
Third, there should be a default forum rule—for these creditors only—to
determine whether the United States would have been the appropriate default
forum. To respect principles of comity and the integrity of the cross-border
insolvency system, the scope of this measure should be narrow. The United
States should limit itself to protecting nonadjusting creditors with interests
located in the forum. For example, the default forum might be the United States
for a company that has its principal place of business in the United States and
has domestic tort creditors. Alternatively, the United States could be the default
forum whenever domestic tort or environmental claimants have claims over a
certain amount.
Note that the debtor is not required to actually bring its case in the default
United States forum. It has several other options. First, it can choose an
alternative forum if the nonadjusting creditors are not affected or do no worse in
that forum than they would have done in the United States. Second, the debtor
could choose an alternative forum if it compensated the nonadjusting creditors
for any shortfall in their position (compared to what would have resulted in the
United States). Finally, the debtor could seek consent from the nonadjusting
creditors to file in an alternative forum.
This system would protect nonadjusting creditors against opportunistic
forum shopping but also limit the ability of those creditors to veto forum choice
and minimize disruptions to the cross-border insolvency system. If the
nonadjusting creditors are a small part of the case, or if the alternative forum’s
value is unrelated to the rights of nonadjusting creditors, the debtor could avoid
a veto by ensuring those creditors consistent treatment in the alternative forum.
The enforcement of this solution would happen by way of the rules for
recognition under chapter 15 or under general principles of comity. A debtor
seeking United States recognition of a foreign proceeding would have to answer
objections brought by nonadjusting creditors who claim they were
disadvantaged by the choice of forum. When such disadvantages were sustained,
the court would deny recognition (unless the debtor could cure the
disadvantage).
Again, this is a drastic measure for reducing global forum shopping and
should be used sparingly as it has the potential to disrupt the cross-border
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insolvency system and lead to retaliation in the global forum wars.155 We
advocate this measure only for forum shopping matters related to nonadjusting
creditors where the market-based solutions, such as precommitted choice
mechanisms, are likely to be inadequate. With that limitation, we do not imagine
that this rule would affect many cross-border insolvency cases.
CONCLUSION
The primary criticism of venue shopping is that small differences in
precedent, judicial exercises of discretion, and local procedures motivate parties
to waste resources on venue shopping and perhaps even motivate jurisdictions
to participate in a race to the bottom. But as we have discussed, ending the race
by prohibiting venue shopping may lead to a more dramatic forum war.
While Delaware’s ascent in the venue race was subtle and perhaps organic,
foreign jurisdictions have made no secret of their intent to join the battle to
attract debtors. Reforms that cut debtors off from their favored venues (or
favored judges) in Delaware, New York, and Texas, significantly lower the
debtor’s opportunity cost of filing abroad. It may be that the expertise of one
judge in White Plains was benefit enough for debtors to incur the extra costs of
chapter 11 proceedings, costs that foreign jurisdictions can eliminate. That
judicial expertise might be the single most important aspect of the United States
bankruptcy system. Once access to that benefit is curtailed, a streamlined
scheme of arrangement in England may look a lot more attractive than a costly
chapter 11 proceeding before a less experienced or unpredictable judge in one
of the United States’ ninety-one other districts.
And unlike the venue race, the forum war will be fought with significantly
more powerful instruments. Judges in different United States venues cannot
unilaterally change the controlling law. Those courts are bound by the Code and
the precedent of the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. They may use
procedural mechanisms to change the speed of the case, or they may exercise
discretion at the margins when finding facts or interpreting law or precedents,
but those are feeble measures compared to what a foreign jurisdiction can do to
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It would, however, be much narrower than the Gibbs Rule, which is currently applied in England. That
rule prohibits recognition in England of foreign proceedings that affect any debt governed by English law. See
Stephan Mandus, The Rule in Gibbs, or How to Protect Local Debt from a Foreign Discharge, OXFORD BUS. L.
BLOG (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/12/rule-gibbs-or-how-protectlocal-debt-foreign-discharge. The rule described here is far narrower because it would only prohibit recognition
of a foreign proceeding when (1) the proceeding affects claims of nonadjusting creditors, (2) those creditors
would have done better had the case been brought in the United States, and (3) the United States was the default
venue where the case should have been brought.
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attract debtors. A foreign jurisdiction can unilaterally change plan voting rules,
provide new measures for obtaining financing, or even alter priority. And it is
likely to be especially bold in doing so if it senses that debtors are dissatisfied
with chapter 11 relief being bundled with unpopular venue restrictions.
To be sure, we do not here take a position on whether the United States
should enter an unconstrained war to be the dominant global insolvency forum.
Such a war might involve substantive legal changes to make chapter 11 more
efficient in a race to the top or to confer benefits on management in a race to the
bottom. Recent reforms in other forums as well as substantive domestic
proposals—such as the “chapter 16” proposal for a quick streamlined
reorganization option—might be viewed as the first shots in this war. But the
lengths to which jurisdictions are willing to go and whether their moves will
push forums to the top or the bottom are still unclear.
But certainly, lawmakers should, in reforming venue rules, consider how
such reforms interact with international developments and the availability of
foreign forums and try to achieve a more cohesive set of policies that address
both domestic venue and global forum choices. The reform elements we propose
offer the foundation for those policies.

